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For patriotic citizens, living in their native country is intrinsically preferable compared to living 
in the diaspora. In this paper, we analyze the implications of such a patriotic lock-in in a world 
with international migration and redistributive taxation. In a formal model of redistribution with 
international migration and fiscal competition we derive the main hypothesis: that countries 
with a more patriotic population should have higher redistributive taxes. Using ISSP survey 
data and combining them with OECD taxation data, we find robust evidence suggesting that 
a) higher patriotism is associated with higher tax burdens, and b) this relation is stronger for 
the upper-middle range of the income distribution. 
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Henry Morgenthau Jr., US Secretary of the Treasury during World War II, instructed Walt
Disney to work on an animated movie to make US citizens less reluctant to pay their income
taxes. The result was entitled The New Spirit and features Donald Duck who is, initially,
disinclined to pay income taxes. He then, however, becomes convinced that ￿Taxes to beat
the Axis￿is his patriotic duty and happily pays his taxes (see Jones 1989: 716n; Watts 1995:
103n).1 Although it was certainly innovative and ground-breaking, the production of The
New Spirit is not a unique episode in history. Indeed, the role of patriotism for ￿scal policy
during war had been acknowledged in the US and UK long before World War II2. Likewise,
patriotism has recurrently been invoked to mobilize citizens for other contributions such as
military service (Levi 1997).
Patriotic sentiments are usually invoked during times of war. Nonetheless, patriotism
is likely to be important for governments￿(￿scal) policy in various contexts, countries and
time periods, not just in times of war. Indeed, moral appeals to ￿patriotic duty￿￿such as
in The New Spirit and its sequel entitled The Spirit of ￿ 43 ￿are likely to carry signi￿cant
weight also in times of peace.3 Moreover, they relate to a warm glow of paying taxes4,
which is only one manifestation of a possibly close link between patriotism and personal
income taxation. A further potentially important link between patriotism and taxation ￿
and the focus of the current paper ￿emerges in an international context when taking into
consideration ￿scal competition between countries and taxpayer mobility. This was already
acknowledged by Seligman (1892, 138n):
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_Spirit.
2On the role of patriotism for war ￿nancing in the UK during World War I, see Stamp (1932). Bank et al.
(2008) collect more systematic evidence on the relationship between US ￿scal policy and wars and demon-
strate that US tax reforms leading to higher tax burdens have often been enacted during wartime. Durand
(1917, 905) relates this association between war and taxes to patriotism: ￿One can hardly overestimate the
e⁄ect of patriotic sentiment during war time as an aid to the ￿scal policy of the government. Much heavier
taxes can be successfully collected during war than during peace.￿
3Interestingly, the discussion about whether paying taxes is a patriotic duty was also an issue in the pres-
idential campaign 2008 (see, e.g., Joe Biden on ABC News, September 22, 2008, and the discussion his
statement induced). While the US is currently at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, Biden￿ s appeal should
mainly be seen against the background of the current ￿nancial crisis.
4Harbaugh et al. (2007) found evidence from brain scans that paying taxes in laboratory experiments causes
physiological rewards, and Konrad and Qari (2008) show that patriotism positively a⁄ects citizens￿tax
compliance.
2It is not always strictly true, as Adam Smith said, that ￿the proprietor of
stock is properly a citizen of the world, and not attached to any particular
country￿ . Feelings of patriotism, of local pride, of desire of proximity to friends,
of long custom and old usage sometimes play a considerable role.
To better understand the underlying argument, it is good to remember that although
patriotism easily becomes a value-laden concept and often bears a negative connotation5, in
essence it refers to ￿devotion to one￿ s country￿(OED 2003: 2122). This love and devotion
can ￿pragmatically ￿be understood as being linked to an intrinsic preference for living
in one￿ s native country, compared to living in the diaspora (all else equal). Patriotism, in
other words, leads individuals to experience a (non-monetary) bene￿t (or ￿patriotic rent￿ )
from residing in their native country.6 Patriotic citizens may then be willing to pay higher
income taxes in their native land, not only because of patriotic duty (see Donald Duck in
The New Spirit), but also because they have to pay these taxes to reside in their native
country.
This paper adds in two main ways to this literature. First, theoretically, we formalize
Seligman￿ s (1892) argumentation about the role of patriotism in the context of ￿scal com-
petition, using a simple median voter framework of redistributive taxation in the spirit of
Meltzer and Richard (1981), enhanced by the possibility of international migration. This
allows us to better characterize the exact e⁄ects of patriotic feelings in an international
context, and derive empirically testable implications. The model shows that, for countries
of equal size, an increase in patriotism in one country raises the equilibrium tax rate in that
country. The intuition is that patriot￿ s ￿patriotic rent￿increases their cost of emigration.
They might thus refrain from moving abroad under conditions where they would have done
so in the absence of their patriotism. Countries can ￿exploit￿this by implementing higher
5Patriotism is often linked to nationalism and hostility toward the ￿out-group￿(e.g., Druckman 1994; Mum-
mendey et al. 2001). This, however, pertains only to ￿blind￿ , ￿unquestioning￿ patriotism, but not to
￿constructive￿patriotism (Schatz et al. 1999, 151). Hence, recent research suggests that a clear distinction
should be made between nationalism and patriotism (see Blank and Schmidt 2003; Huddy and Khatib
2007, and references therein).
6This rent can be one of the underpinnings for location preferences such as ￿home attachment￿ , which has
been assumed and analyzed, e.g., by Mansoorian and Myers (1993). They, however, focus on countries￿
incentives for interregional transfers.
3taxes in the equilibrium.7
Second, rather than rely on descriptive evidence, we test this main prediction of our
model using the International Social Survey Programme National Identity (2003) study ￿
which includes information on individuals￿patriotism ￿ and matching this dataset with
OECD data on tax burdens (across 21 countries in the year 2003). The empirical analysis
indicates a strong and consistent positive correlation between patriotism and ￿scal burden,
even when controlling for other factors. This result remains robust in a number of alter-
native speci￿cations, and when employing an instrumental variables approach to control
for possible endogeneity. This suggests that the higher shadow cost for patriotic citizens
relocating abroad does indeed, as hypothesized by the theory, allow countries to exploit the
patriotic feelings of their population through the tax system.
Our analysis contributes to several strands of research. First, a literature starting with
Meltzer and Richard (1981) identi￿es determinants of the amount of redistribution. While
Meltzer and Richard (1981) themselves highlight that the e¢ ciency costs of taxation may
limit redistribution, later studies illustrate that redistribution may be a⁄ected by the modes
of redistribution available (Lizzeri and Persico 2001), uncertainty and perceptions about so-
cial mobility during lifetime or across generations (Glazer and Konrad 1994, Piketty 1995,
Benabou and Ok 2001), the role of redistribution as insurance (Sinn 1995, Moene and
Wallerstein 2001), speci￿city and portability of skills (Iversen and Soskice 2001), demogra-
phy (Razin et al. 2002), non-monotonicity (Epple and Romano 1996), the existence of power
coalitions (Breyer and Ursprung 1998, Iversen and Soskice 2006), proportional representa-
tion in political decision making (Austen-Smith 2000) or the amount of mobilization and
political engagement (Solt 2008). Our paper reveals an important role of patriotism: patri-
otism may a⁄ect the ability of governments to extract tax revenue from the highly skilled,
highly mobile and use this revenue for redistribution to the less well-o⁄ in a globalized
world.
We also add a new aspect to the discussion about the future of the welfare state and
7For complementary theoretical analyses that focus on di⁄erent mechanisms that are also based on ￿home
attachment￿ , allow for factor mobility on the basis of given taxes, and generate higher taxes in the equilib-
rium for di⁄erent reasons, see Ogura (2006) for capital income taxes, and Konrad (2008) for labor income
tax competition with loyal and non-loyal citizens for a revenue-maximizing government.
4redistribution in an international context. Rodrik (1998) argued that welfare state institu-
tions may become more important as countries become more open in a globalizing world.
But, at the same time, policy makers and economists are concerned that migration and
international tax competition may erode the ￿nancial basis for governmental policy. That
is, while from a welfare point of view mobility has upsides and downsides,8 high mobil-
ity of highly skilled (and high income earners) is likely to have detrimental e⁄ects on the
amount of ￿scal revenue that is available for redistribution. The tax competition literature
in economics, for example, has extensively analyzed the (potentially) detrimental e⁄ects
of tax competition for mobile tax bases and the resulting reduced scope for redistributive
taxation and ￿nancing public goods.9 In line with Seligman￿ s (1892) pioneering conjecture
from more than one hundred years ago, we argue that patriotism, and the attachment it
generates to home, might help prevent a possible ￿race to the bottom￿among mobile high
income earners. Intuitively, patriotism generates a base of loyal citizens which makes the
tax base less elastic with respect to tax rate changes, and this leads to a tax competition
equilibrium in which taxes may stay high, and thus to higher taxes in the countries with a
more patriotic population.10
In the next section the formal framework is outlined. Then, in section 3, we turn to the
empirical evaluation of the core predictions about the link between patriotism and taxation.
Finally, section 4 brings together the main conclusions and discusses some implications of
our ￿ndings.
8Bhagwati and Dellalfar (1973) and Bhagwati (1976) argued more than 30 years ago that ￿brain drain￿
endangers the countries from which this drain originates and argued for a coordinated corrective tax on
the brain drain. Justman and Thisse (1997, 2000) maintain that mobility of skilled labor may deprive a
country of the fruits of public educational investment (thus leading to underinvestment in public education).
To the contrary, Andersson and Konrad (2003) point out that the outmigration threat may overcome the
problem of time-consistent taxation of the returns from private investment in education. Wildasin (2000)
￿combining both views ￿claims international migration can be good or bad for educational investment,
depending on the public or private nature of education ￿nancing.
9This concern has been raised ￿rst in the context of capital income taxation. See, e.g., Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986), Wildasin (1988) and Wilson (1986). Sinn (1997) shows why tax competition is likely
to be dysfunctional and may make the welfare state unsustainable. For overviews of this vast literature,
see Wilson (1999), Brueckner (2003), Fuest et al. (2005) and Słrensen (2007).
10Apart from patriotism and the citizen loyalty it may generate, other elements that cause countervailing
forces to the race to the bottom have been identi￿ed in theoretical work. Baldwin and Krugman (2004)
focus on agglomeration advantages. Hohaus, Konrad and Thum (1994) and Zissimos and Wooders (2008)
consider aspects of heterogeneity and product di⁄erentiation. Our empirical test is independent of these
other aspects.
52 The formal framework
We consider a static11 game with migration followed by taxation and redistribution. Sup-
pose there are two countries, A and B. Each country has two political parties denoted
as DK and RK, for K 2 fA;Bg. The sets of individuals born in countries A and B are
IA = [0;1+nA] and IB = [0;1+nB]. In each country, a subset [0;1] of individuals has low
productivity, implying that they earn an income equal to wL. The remaining individuals
have a high productivity, and earn a gross income equal to wH > wL. The size of the
group of individuals with high productivity born in A and B is nA < 1=2 and nB < 1=2,
respectively. The incomes wL and wH are exogenous and ￿xed re￿ ecting, for instance,
individuals￿marginal productivity in a competitive labor market with constant returns.12
Individuals also di⁄er in terms of their patriotism: each individual obtains a particular
(non-monetary) pleasure from residing in his/her native country, compared to living in the
respective other country.13 For an individual i born in country K, this pleasure is denoted
as hK + ￿i. It consists of a deterministic and a stochastic component. The deterministic
component hK ￿ 0 measures the happiness individuals enjoy on average from residing in
their native country, and we refer to values hA and hB as the average patriotism rent. This
rent does not need to be the same across both countries. The stochastic component, ￿i,
is an independent draw from the same distribution for all individuals. We assume that
E(￿i) = 0, and that the distribution is characterized by a cumulative distribution function
11Our framework could be embedded into a fully dynamic multi-period supergame with the two-stage game
considered here being played in each period: i.e. migration choices followed by taxation choices in each of
the periods, with individuals and parties who have an in￿nite life and maximize discounted present values
(or an overlapping generations structure). In the absence of migration costs, the equilibrium we derive
below for the static game is also an equilibrium in such a ￿nitely or in￿nitely repeated game. If there was
an in￿nite number of periods, equilibria other than the one we derive can be supported (e.g., by trigger
strategies), and the uniqueness result we have would be lost.
12We could make wL and wH a function of relative scarcity of types, or of other factors of production (such
as capital) in the two countries. We refrain from doing so, however, as this would signi￿cantly complicate
the analysis without a⁄ecting our main conclusions.
13One might argue that non-natives may over time develop patriotism toward their new home-country.
This is not captured here. This need not be problematic as the country moved into is less likely to ￿re-
socialize￿ individuals into feeling patriotic about it when these individuals￿identities and loyalties are
￿rmly established in the native country (Hooghe 2005; Johnston 2005). Given that scholars studying
identity formation and the internalization of norms and loyalties generally agree that ￿agents￿￿rst and
most intensive period of socialization occurs inside the main institutions of state socialization (for example,
education systems)￿(Johnston 2005, 1026), the development of patriotic feelings may be more di¢ cult for
immigrants. This holds especially for those who have spent considerable time in their native country (as
relative length of embeddedness within both structures is crucial; see Egeberg 2004).
6G(￿i) that is continuous on its whole support - given by [￿(wH +maxfhA;hBg);wH] - and
continuously di⁄erentiable on this interval.14
In Stage 1, individuals choose whether to stay in their country of origin or to migrate to
the other country. Simplifying, we assume that individuals with a low income are immobile,
and individuals with a high income are perfectly mobile in this stage.15 The sets JA and JB
with measures 1 + ￿A and 1 + ￿B describe the post-migration distribution of individuals.
Here, ￿A 2 [0;nA + nB] is the size of the population of high income earners who choose to
reside in country A, and similarly for ￿B. As there is no other place to go to or to come
from, it must be that ￿A + ￿B = nA + nB. These population sizes are observed at the end
of stage 1. Moreover, individuals lose their mobility at the end of this stage.16
In Stage 2, a political equilibrium determines taxes and redistribution. The timing with
taxation following the migration choices maps the idea that migration decisions are ￿more
long-term￿than taxation, but is not essential for the qualitative predictions here. In each
country (K 2 fA;Bg) both parties ￿DK and RK ￿choose policy platforms (tK;SH
K;SL
K)
consisting of a proportional tax rate tK 2 [0;1] that applies uniformly to all inhabitants, and
non-negative subsidies SH
K ￿ 0 and SL
K ￿ 0, where SH
K and SL
K are the amounts paid to high
and low productivity residents respectively. We allow for di⁄erent per-capita subsidies for
the two di⁄erent types of individuals, but require that all individuals with the same gross
income receive the same per-capita subsidy. The proposed policy platform has to obey
a government budget constraint. Given that gross tax revenue in country K is given by
(wL + ￿KwH)tK and tax collection has a cost equal to
t2
K
2 (wL + ￿KwH), net tax revenue
14The random element induces a smooth distribution of patriotism rent, similar to the distribution of home-
attachment in Mansoorian and Myers (1993).
15The assumption that migration is only an option for high income earners is common in the literature ￿
see, for example, Andersson and Konrad (2003) and Beine et al. (2008) ￿and builds on ￿ndings by, among
others, Docquier and Marfouk (2006), that highly educated workers are ￿ve to ten times more likely to
emigrate. Note also that ￿welfare tourism￿￿i.e., migration by the poor for welfare bene￿ts ￿is probably
of only minor concern in the international context analyzed here, as transfer entitlements can be tied to
how long a person has resided in the country.
16Mobility is often higher in earlier stages of life (e.g., when deciding where to study or at the beginning
of one￿ s professional career) and, due to high set-up costs, is a more ￿long-term￿ decision compared to
taxation (which is adjusted more frequently). Similar timing regarding migration and policy choices is
adopted, for instance, in Mitsui and Sato (2001).
7TK that is available for redistribution is17




)(wL + ￿KwH). (1)
Hence, a balanced government budget requires
SL
K + SH




)(wL + ￿KwH). (2)
Voters observe the policy platform choices of the parties and vote for one or the other
platform. We assume sincere voting. The platform that receives the most votes is imple-
mented. In case of a draw, a random device decides on implementation. Once these decisions
are made, income accrues, taxes are collected, tax revenue is redistributed according to the
policy platform and the game ends.
We now turn to the payo⁄s of the players. Individuals care about the sum of net income
and patriotic rents. The net income of an individual locating in country K is (1￿tK)wL+SL
K
if the income of the individual is wL, and (1 ￿ tK)wH + SH
K if the individual￿ s income is
wH. An individual i born in country A and staying in this country receives in addition a
patriotic rent equal to the sum of the deterministic average patriotism rent hA, and the
idiosyncratic component ￿i. Note that the overall patriotic rent for i can be negative in
country A even though hA ￿ 0 if the idiosyncratic component ￿i is su¢ ciently negative. If
the individual i is born in A and moves to B, the received patriotism rent is zero. This is a
normalization and without loss of generality.18 The intrinsic patriotic rent for an individual
i who is born in B and stays in B is de￿ned analogously as hB + ￿i. Summarizing, the
17The cost of taxation may have many possible microeconomic underpinnings. In the simplest case, the cost
of taxation may be the physical transaction cost of tax collection or tax compliance. Still, it could also be
seen as a short cut for accounting for an excess burden of taxation. The convexity of this cost in the tax
rate is a common and plausible assumption used to describe the excess burden of taxes (e.g., Bolton and
Roland 1996: 100).
18For instance, the patriotic rents for living in countries A and B could be hA + ￿i and ￿i, respectively,
for an individual i born in country A, with stochastic ￿i and ￿i. In this case, ￿i can simply be seen as
￿i = ￿i ￿ ￿i. The absolute levels of ￿i and ￿i matter for happiness, but the di⁄erence is all that matters
for the migration decision.
8payo⁄ of an individual i with high income wH, born in country A (i 2 IA) is
ui = (1 ￿ tA)wH + SH
A + hA + ￿i if i stays in A
ui = (1 ￿ tB)wH + SH
B if i moves to B.
(3)
The payo⁄for individuals born in country B is de￿ned analogously. The payo⁄of individuals
with low income in country K is
ui = (1 ￿ tK)wL + SL
K + hK + ￿i. (4)
As individuals with low productivity do not have a residence choice here, they always stay
in the country where they were born. They may have a positive or negative patriotic rent
from this.
Finally, we assume all political parties are o¢ ce motivated. Each party chooses the
policy platform that, given the anticipated choice by the competing party in the same
country, maximizes the probability of winning a majority of votes. As the median voter
theorem will apply in our framework, it is well known that a large class of alternative party
preferences would lead to the same voting equilibrium in stage 2. Solving for the subgame
perfect equilibrium of this game, we ￿nd two main results.
Proposition 1 A subgame perfect equilibrium exists and is unique.
A proof is in the appendix. Intuitively, the groups with low productivity choose their
optimal income tax rates in each of the two countries. They take into consideration that
the share of highly productive individuals in their own country is decreasing in the tax rate
in their own, and increasing in the tax rate of the other country. This causes a unique
crossing of the reaction functions. Patriotism, and the home attachment (or ￿lock-in￿ ) it
creates, typically leads to strictly positive taxes in the equilibrium. Patriotism weakens the
￿race to the bottom￿in competitive tax setting between countries.19
The comparative static properties of this equilibrium yield the main hypothesis of our
empirical analysis:
19See Brueckner (2003) for an empirical overview of the e⁄ects of strategic interaction among governments.
9Proposition 2 Higher patriotism in a country yields a higher equilibrium tax rate in this
country and a lower equilibrium tax rate in the other country (i.e., dtA
dhA > 0, dtB




A proof of Proposition 2 is also in the appendix. If country A initially has an indigenous
population that is more patriotic on average than the population in country B (i.e., hA >
hB), then, for identical tax rates (i.e., tA = tB), the mobile high income earners in A are
less likely to emigrate than the mobile high income earners from country B. Country A
thus ends up with a larger set of high income earners in the post-migration equilibrium
than country B (￿A > ￿B). For the median voter in A, this makes a higher tax rate more
desirable than in B. This higher tax has general equilibrium repercussions. As shown in
the proof of the proposition, these repercussions are weaker than the primary e⁄ect.
Proposition 2 yields our main empirical hypothesis: higher patriotism induces higher
tax rates.
3 Empirical analysis
In this section, we assess our general hypothesis by linking individuals￿￿patriotism￿(using
the 2003 ISSP ￿National Identity II￿survey) to their income tax burden (exploiting the
OECD ￿Taxing Wages￿database), for a set of 21 countries in the year 2003.20 The em-
pirical model and the data employed in the analysis are described in section 4.1, while the
main results are brought forward in section 4.2. Finally, section 4.3 provides a number of
robustness checks.
3.1 Empirical speci￿cation
We assess the predictions derived from the theory by estimating a regression equation of
the following form:
Taxi;j = ￿0 + ￿1Proudi;j + x0
i;j￿2 + ei;j (5)
20The countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, (West-)Germany, Hungary,
Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
10where Taxi;j represents the (income) tax burden21 faced by individual i in country j,
Proudi;j denotes individual i￿ s level of patriotism and x0
i;j is a vector of control variables
(each of these is further discussed below). While equation (5) is clearly speci￿ed based on
the use of individual-level data, it is important to stress that the analysis below is carried
out both at the individual level and at a more aggregate level of analysis (we return to this
issue below).
The dependent variable, Taxi;j, is de￿ned as gross income minus net income, divided
by gross income. As such, it quanti￿es the income tax burden as the share of gross income
paid in income taxes and social security contributions. It is calculated by linking the
income level each respondent in the 2003 ISSP survey claims to earn to the income tax
rate data in the OECD ￿Taxing Wages￿study. The latter study provides information on
workers￿income tax payments as well as social security contributions levied on employees for
several benchmark cases depending on household type and income level. More speci￿cally,
information regarding the overall income tax burden is provided for 200 levels of income
(ranging from 0% to 200% of the average employee￿ s income) for each of the countries
surveyed.22 This thus provides a relatively detailed description of the income tax burden
along the income scale, allowing us to match each respondent closely to the tax burden
calculated by the OECD for his/her income group (and household type).
We restrict our sample to those respondents in the ISSP dataset who are single, and
this is for two reasons. First, the ISSP data do not allow a clear portrait of how multi-
individual households are constituted (e.g., whether adults in a given household are married,
cohabiting, live with their (grand)parents or children is di¢ cult to establish with certainty).
This information, however, is crucial to accurately determine the appropriate tax rates in
the OECD data, and thus to derive our central tax burden variable. Second, singles are
21Other taxes might play a role as well. Still, income taxes might be particularly important (as illustrated
by the choice in The New Spirit to focus on income tax payments). Moreover, we have no information on
other taxes.
22One could argue that individuals earning the average worker￿ s income (or even twice that amount) are not
necessarily the ￿rich and mobile￿for which our theoretical model (implicitly) predicts the strongest e⁄ects.
Nevertheless, for most countries in our sample, the 90th-percentile of the income distribution corresponds
to approximately 1.5 times the average worker￿ s income (Atkinson, 2008). Exceptions are Ireland and the
US, where the 90th-percentile is at 200% of the average worker￿ s income (Atkinson, 2008). Hence, we
feel con￿dent that most of the income distribution which is of empirical interest to our model is de facto
represented in our sample. We are grateful to Tom Cusack for extensive and fruitful discussions on this
point.
11likely to be more mobile and less attached to a country for personal reasons (e.g., married
individuals, or individuals taking care of children and/or (grand)parents are more strongly
bound to a given country and might ￿ grow￿to love it because of that). Singles constitute
a ￿ least-likely￿category of individuals to become exploited by a national government for
patriotic reasons, providing a harsh test for structural e⁄ects. If one observes the predicted
e⁄ects within this group, it provides strong evidence in favor of our hypothesis (cf. Eckstein,
1975; King et al., 1994; Yin, 2003).
We also exclude all (1,309) respondents claiming an income below 60% of the average
worker￿ s income in their country. This, likewise, has two reasons. First, these citizens often
have a net wage exceeding the gross wage (leading to a negative tax burden), making it
di¢ cult to interpret their tax ￿burden￿ . This lack of tax payments also implies that this
group cannot be exploited by the government through higher income taxation related to
their (possible) patriotism. Second, net income exceeding gross income indicates that these
respondents are likely to be recipients of social welfare bene￿t schemes. They might prefer
higher (income) tax rates to ￿nance redistribution in their favor and they become more
attached to their country due to the receipt of welfare bene￿ts. This, however, entails a
reverse causality argument (where high tax rates lead to more ￿patriotism￿ ). To prevent
this from arti￿cially in￿ ating support for our hypothesis, we exclude this income group
(although we return to this exclusion in the robustness analysis below). Imposing a cut-o⁄
at 60% is arbitrary. We chose this cut-o⁄ to exclude all negative tax burdens from the
sample, thereby limiting the e⁄ect of welfare bene￿t receipts on our tax burden variable.
Moreover, imposing a cut-o⁄ at 50% or 70% does not a⁄ect our main ￿ndings (see Table 3
in the results section).
The core explanatory variable of our analysis is the respondent￿ s patriotism (Proudi;j).
It is determined relying on a set of questions in the 2003 ISSP ￿National Identity II￿survey
probing for the respondent￿ s proudness about his/her country: ￿How proud are you of
[country] in each of the following?￿Since this question is asked about the country one resides
in at the time of the survey, we exclude all non-nationals from the dataset such as to obtain
the most accurate representation of how citizens of a given country feel toward their own
country. Hence, we only regard, say, French citizens living in France and exclude people of
12non-French nationality interviewed in France. This restriction brings the empirical analysis
closer in line with the idea in the theoretical model that non-nationals (are likely to) lack a
￿patriotism rent￿ .23 Note also that articulated patriotism ￿as measured in surveys ￿is not
necessarily a direct measure of hA and hB. Patriotism is sampled among the population that
emerges in the post-migration equilibrium. As some individuals with su¢ ciently negative
idiosyncratic patriotism ￿i < 0 will have left the country in equilibrium, average articulated
patriotism among the indigenous population in the post-migration equilibrium should be
higher than the average patriotism among all individuals who are born and raised in a
given country. Nevertheless, for the testable implications of the formal analysis, this is not
a problem.24
￿Patriotism￿may, at ￿rst, seem di¢ cult to quantify. In fact, the ￿proudness￿ -question
is raised for ten di⁄erent social, economic, historical and political characteristics of the
country at hand (see Table 1), leading to the question which of these variables is most closely
connected with the patriotism rent from living in one￿ s own mother country. Fortunately,
there is a natural solution to this problem. As all ten questions explore one common
underlying concept (i.e., patriotic sentiments) and are measured in common units (i.e. a
four-point Likert-type scale ranging from ￿very proud￿to ￿not proud at all￿ ), they satisfy
the basic criteria for use in a factor analysis (cf. Kennedy, 2005). We therefore follow
standard practice and combine the answers from all ten questions into a single index through
23Nonetheless, retaining non-nationals in the sample ￿based on the idea that people living for a long period
of time in a country that is not their native country may nonetheless develop an attachment to this country
(cf. supra) ￿does not a⁄ect the qualitative ￿ndings of our analysis (available upon request).
24More formally, the average patriotism rent among the indigenous population in the post-migration equi-
librium is
[hK + E(￿i ji 2 IK \ JK )] > hK for K 2 fA;Bg.
For instance, let nA = nB. Then, for hA > hB, we ￿nd that tA > tB in the equilibrium. This means
that, apart from the patriotism rent and in pure income terms, the ￿scal conditions in country A for high
income earners are less attractive than in country B. Hence, the cut-o⁄ hA + ￿i of indigenous individuals
who stay in A is higher than the cut-o⁄ hB + ￿i for indigenous individuals in B. Accordingly, tA > tB
and the di⁄erential e⁄ects on outmigration in A and in B reinforces the pre-existing di⁄erences between
the expected patriotism rents of non-migrants in the two countries from hA ￿ hB to
[hA + E(￿i jIA \ JA)] ￿ [hB + E(￿i jIB \ JB )] > hA ￿ hB
in the equilibrium. For our estimations, this implies that the coe¢ cient that measures the e⁄ect of
di⁄erences in actual patriotism will be biased downward. Hence, if actual migration changes the measured
patriotism in the indigenous population of a country, then this e⁄ect biases the empirical test against our
hypothesis.
13Table 1: Patriotism factor analysis (N = 5023)
Rotated Factor Loadings
The way democracy works .68244177
Its political in￿ uence in the world .60596827
economic achievements .62622493
Its social security system .62780228
Its scienti￿c and technological achievements .35983848
Its achievements in sports .11578783
Its achievements in the arts and literature .16349948
armed forces .3408436
Its history .15194136
Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society .53190732
Eigenvalue: 2.211
Variance explained: 69.47%
a factor analysis using the principle-factor method as the technique of extraction (with
orthogonal varimax rotation; Kaiser 1958).25 The scores of the ￿rst principal factor resulting
from this analysis constitute our composite indicator of patriotism when estimating equation
(5)). The analysis reveals that the data can be summarized by one single strong factor.26
Using this factor as a measure of proudness becomes the natural choice for quantifying
patriotism. Table 1 shows the results for this ￿rst principal factor.
Table 1 indicates that it is mainly the ￿rst four and the last question which load most
strongly on the extracted underlying component. For these ￿ve questions, the (rotated)
factor loading lies well above the critical value of 0.35 suggested by Pennings et al. (1999).
The questions regarding scienti￿c and technological achievement as well as armed forces
obtain factor loadings which hover around this critical value, while the remaining three
questions appear to add little to the underlying component. Intuitively it appears rea-
sonable that these ￿ve questions are highly correlated with latent patriotism. For most
people, patriotic feelings or proudness of one￿ s country are more likely to derive from, say,
individuals￿perceptions of the country￿ s political in￿ uence in the world than its achieve-
25Such an analysis allows e¢ cient consolidation of the information from a ￿large number of possible ex-
planatory variables￿into one (or, possibly, multiple) composite indicator(s) (Kennedy 2005, 212) and has
been argued to ￿mitigate the in￿ uence of idiosyncratic measurement error within each of the variables
(...) [thereby maximizing] the likelihood of measuring the underlying concept more precisely￿(Co⁄Ø and
Geys 2005, 490). Note also that the suitability of data for a factor analysis is often measured via the
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy (which indicates the proportion of variance
that is common among the variables included in the analysis). The (normalized) index has values between
0 and 1, with larger values indicating that the data are better suited to factor analysis (Kaiser 1974; Kaiser
and Rice 1974). In our case, the KMO-index obtains a value of 0.864.
26There was only one factor with an eigenvalue larger than one.
14ment in arts or sports (which may be deemed as more individual, rather than country-level,
achievements). Given that the factor scores resulting from the factor analysis increase with
patriotic feelings, support of the main hypothesis would imply ￿1> 0, ceteris paribus.
Beside the central explanatory variable, we add a number of control variables to cap-
ture the e⁄ect of potential mediating factors. First of all, an individual￿ s tax burden is
critically determined by his/her position in the income distribution. To account for this,
we employ two approaches. In a direct approach, we include individual i￿ s position in the
income distribution of his/her country (IncPosi;j). Speci￿cally, IncPosi;j designates for
each individual i in country j what percentage of country j￿ s average wage his/her income
represents. It is derived by linking individual i￿ s income (as stated in the ISSP survey) to
the corresponding income (and tax) bracket in the OECD dataset. Hence, as the OECD
provides detailed data for 200 income levels (see above), IncPosi;j ranges from 0% to 200%.
The coe¢ cient estimate is expected to be positive. In a second, more indirect approach,
we approximate each individual i￿ s wage (and thereby income position) relying on a num-
ber of individual-level characteristics that are generally found to be closely linked to wage
levels. Speci￿cally, and building on an entire literature starting with the work of Mincer
(1958, 1974), we include experience (proxied via an individual￿ s age; i.e., Agei and Agei
2),
years of education (Edui), gender (Sexi), union membership (Unioni) and public sector
employment (Publici). This alternative speci￿cation is in closer keeping with the literature
on individual-level wage determinants and, more importantly, allows us to assess whether
our results are robust to choices made regarding the proxy for individuals￿relative income
position.
Further, we control for a number of country characteristics. First, the country￿ s unem-
ployment rate (Unemj) is taken from the World Development Indicators. Unemployment
increases the need for public spending on unemployment (and, potentially, other social wel-
fare) bene￿ts, and thus is likely to be associated with higher equilibrium tax rates. We
include the level of GDP (per capita and in natural logarithms to account for the highly
skewed distribution of this variable; GDPj). Following Wagner￿ s Law, we expect that the
wealth of a country is associated with higher taxes. Inclusion of this variable is also im-
portant to account for the relative size of countries. We also account for the ideological
15persuasion of the government (IDEOj) based on the oft-cited idea that left-wing parties
are more in favor of government intervention and redistribution than their right-wing coun-
terparts, which is likely to lead to higher tax burdens (e.g., Hibbs 1977). The variable
IDEOj is obtained from the Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al. 2008) and
takes on values between 1 and 5, with higher numbers representing more leftist governments.
As governments are unable to immediately change ￿scal policies to match their ideological
preferences, we lag this variable by four years. Due to the strong temporal dependence
in the series, using slightly shorter or longer lags makes little di⁄erence to our ￿ndings.
Given the coding scheme, we expect this variable to be positively related to the income tax
burden. We include an index of ￿scal decentralization (Decentrj), measured as the share of
total government revenues raised at the national level (likewise taken from the Comparative
Political Dataset; Armingeon et al. 2008). The idea here is that if public good provision is
decentralized and lower-level governments are ￿scally autonomous, the central government
itself is in need of less ￿nancial resources, allowing income tax rates to be lower.
Although our dataset pools cross-sections from di⁄erent countries, we do not include
country ￿xed e⁄ects. To include country ￿xed e⁄ects would lead to a focus on within-
country variation, whereas our model predicts that variation in patriotism is associated with
between-country tax di⁄erentials (controlling for other factors, in particular income). Since
we use various country variables to control for obvious level di⁄erences in the tax schedule
among the countries in our sample, one might consider clustering the standard errors on
the country level to control for unobserved country characteristics. However, Hubert-White
type standard-errors for country-level clusters are inappropriate in our setting as it requires
a large number of clusters with relatively few observations in each cluster.27 Our sample
shows the exact opposite tendency: few clusters with numerous observations.
A possible objection against a pure individual-level approach might be the dependence
of observations of individuals who live in the same country and belong to the same income
class, as those respondents clearly face the same tax burden. To address these issues we
estimate two variants of equation (5). The ￿rst speci￿cation is on the individual-level,
27See Wooldridge (2003) and the references therein for studies showing that cluster-robust estimation may
fail even if the number of clusters is as large as 40 or 50.
16while the second version averages all variables on the country-income level. This drastically
reduces the number of observations28, but goes a long way to address the dependence
problem discussed above.29
3.2 Results
Our main ￿ndings are brought together in Table 2. The ￿rst column regresses individu-
als￿tax burdens on their patriotism score (Proud) controlling only for the relative income
position (IncPos). The second column reports the baseline speci￿cation on the individual
level and controls for income position and country characteristics. The third column prox-
ies the income position indirectly by a number of individual characteristics. The last two
columns in Table 2 present the results on the aggregate level, using income classes rather
than individuals as the units of observation. For this, we identify all respondents with the
same relative income position separately for each country. The average patriotism of these
groups is denoted as ￿Aver. Proud￿ . Column (4) regresses the income tax burden for each
income group on the average patriotism controlling only for the income position. Thus,
column (4) is the aggregate version of column (1). Finally, column (5) adds country-level
controls analogously to column (2). Since the ￿indirect￿alternative (column 3) makes no
intuitive sense in the collapsed dataset, we refrain from this additional estimation in that
setting.
Starting discussion of our ￿ndings with a brief description of the control variables, we ￿nd
that ￿as expected ￿individuals placed relatively higher in the country￿ s income distribution
face a signi￿cantly higher tax burden. Also, in line with the proposition that left-wing
governments are more in favor of government intervention, the tax burden is higher when
the government￿ s ideological position (four years ago) was further to the left. The extent of
￿scal decentralization, on the other hand, is linked to a lower income tax burden (supporting
28The maximum number of observations in this case would be equal to the number of countries times the
number of income classes (i.e., 200), but our sample does not provide respondents for all income levels for
each country.
29Some might deem this still does not go far enough. Collapsing data at the country level (thus leaving one
observation per country), however, decreases the sample size to 21, precluding reliable statistical analysis.
Nevertheless, casual observation from cross-plotting the resulting tax burden and patriotism data at the
country level shows that even in this case our results are qualitatively left una⁄ected (while admittedly
not controlling for possible confounding factors).
17Table 2: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
IncPos 0:12248￿￿￿ 0:10195￿￿￿ 0.08491￿￿￿ 0:08619￿￿￿













GDP 3:96927￿￿￿ 3:14274￿￿￿ 0:59531
(0:51366) (0:58088) (0:79669)
Unem 0:38383￿￿￿ 0:30377￿￿￿ 0:09516
(0:08271) (0:09112) (0:13024)
IDEO 2:54898￿￿￿ 2:76133￿￿￿ 3:18169￿￿￿
(0:08774) (0:11362) (0:32262)
Decentr ￿0:05294￿￿￿ ￿0:06389￿￿￿ ￿0:05474￿￿
(0:01048) (0:01273) (0:02323)
Proud 2:26109￿￿￿ 0:67330￿￿￿ 0:86107￿￿￿
(0:23151) (0:19506) (0:24705)
Aver. Proud 3.56788￿￿￿ 1:89189￿￿￿
(0.66683) (0:62989)
_cons 14:21586￿￿￿ ￿28:35142￿￿￿ ￿18:93337￿￿￿ 19.65969￿￿￿ 8:17895
(0:54147) (5:97603) (6:81860) (1.16655) (8:77925)
N 1941 1777 1649 292 282
adj. R2 0:33209 0:54374 0:34812 0.27319 0:53518
Robust standard errors in parentheses
￿ p < 0:10,
￿￿ p < 0:05,
￿￿￿ p < 0:01
Results are from OLS regressions. The explained variable for columns (1)-(3) is the tax burden
of individual i in country j. The explained variable for columns (4) and (5) is the average income
tax burden calculated (separately for each country) for all available income classes.
IncPos is the repondent￿ s relative income position. It ranges from 0% to 200% and is equal to
100% if the respondent￿ s income is equal to the average single worker￿ s income in the OECD
taxing wages study. Sex is a dummy indicating males. Edu denotes years of schooling. Public is
a dummy indicating if the respondent works in the public sector. Union is a dummy indicating
union membership. Proud is respondent￿ s patriotism. It is the predicted score for the ￿rst
principal factor derived from a set of 10 patriotism questions. GDP (per capita and in natural
logarithm) and unemployment rate (Unem) are taken from the world development indicators.
IDEO is an ordinal ranking for government￿ s ideological position and takes integer values between
1 and 5, where higher values indicate more leftist governments. Decentr is an index of ￿scal
decentralization, de￿ned as the share of government revenues raised at the national level. Aver.
Proud is the average patriotism calculated (separately for each country) for all available income
classes.
Column (1) controls directly for the income position by using IncPos, while column (3) proxies the
income position by other individual characteristics. Column (2) shows the baseline speci￿cation
which adds country-level controls to the individual income position. Columns (4) and (5) show
the aggregate versions of columns (1) and (2), respectively.
18the idea that the central government in such a setting needs less resources from, among
others, income taxation). These three results are robust in sign and signi￿cance across
both the individual-level and the country-income level sample. GDP and unemployment
show the expected positive relation to the tax burden, but this is only statistically signi￿cant
at conventional levels in the individual-level estimations.
Turning to our central patriotism variable, we ￿nd strong and consistent support for
our main proposition. The estimations based on individual data (columns (1)-(3) in Table
2) show that individual patriotism ￿ while controlling for the relative income position￿is
positively associated with the individual income tax burden. Individuals who are more
patriotic (in the sense that they are proud of their country) face a signi￿cantly higher
income tax burden. The point estimates are very similar in all three estimations, indicating
that this result is not dependent on the approach used to measure individuals￿relative
income positions. Further, the estimates using averages of individuals in income classes
(columns (4) and (5) in Table 2) show that the positive association remains strong on the
more aggregate level. This evidence is strongly in line with the theoretical hypothesis.
It suggests that countries are able to exploit the patriotic feelings of their population by
levying higher taxes.30
We also assess whether the patriotism e⁄ect in our dataset is particularly strong for
high income groups and/or particularly weak for low income groups. We do this in two
ways. First, we estimate the model for those respondents of the ISSP survey who claim to
earn less than 60% of the average worker￿ s income. For these low income people, the theory
predicts no relation between patriotism and the tax burden (though, as mentioned, there
may be a reverse causality problem here leading to a spurious positive relationship between
the two variables, see section 4.1). Column (1) of Table 3 estimates the model on this low
income subsample of our population (i.e., 1,309 observations) and illustrates that this is
indeed the case. The patriotism variable has a positive sign, but never reaches statistical
signi￿cance at conventional levels. Column (2) estimates the model for all respondents with
an income above 50% of the average worker￿ s income. Columns (3) and (4) show the results
30This does not imply that an individual￿ s higher patriotism causes him/her to be taxed higher on an
individual basis (as, obviously, tax systems do not work on such an individual basis). It does indicate,
however, that the tax system underlying individuals￿tax burdens can extract patriotic rents.
19Table 3: Regression Results for di⁄erent cut-o⁄ values of the income level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
￿ 60% ￿ 50% ￿ 60% ￿ 70%
IncPos 6:10305￿￿￿ 0:11109￿￿￿ 0:10195￿￿￿ 0:11626￿￿￿
(0:48537) (0:00338) (0:00381) (0:00401)
GDP ￿54:12004￿￿￿ 3:42926￿￿￿ 3:96927￿￿￿ 4:03107￿￿￿
(9:62412) (0:43179) (0:51366) (0:60198)
Unem ￿6:97151￿￿￿ 0:34582￿￿￿ 0:38383￿￿￿ 0:36360￿￿￿
(1:96084) (0:07123) (0:08271) (0:09705)
IDEO ￿22:31255￿￿￿ 2:72026￿￿￿ 2:54898￿￿￿ 2:46445￿￿￿
(4:85806) (0:08158) (0:08774) (0:08731)
Decentr 0:48920 ￿0:07411￿￿￿ ￿0:05294￿￿￿ ￿0:05494￿￿￿
(0:32509) (0:00913) (0:01048) (0:01157)
Proud 9:91470 0:51486￿￿￿ 0:67330￿￿￿ 0:62607￿￿￿
(10:31079) (0:17757) (0:19506) (0:19898)
_cons 334:49453￿￿￿ ￿23:21967￿￿￿ ￿28:35142￿￿￿ ￿30:64166￿￿￿
(93:05330) (4:99381) (5:97603) (7:06587)
N 1309 2114 1777 1595
adj. R2 0:31833 0:60821 0:54374 0:57715
Robust standard errors in parentheses
￿ p < 0:10,
￿￿ p < 0:05,
￿￿￿ p < 0:01
Results are from OLS regressions. The explained variable is the tax burden
of individual i in country j.
Proud is respondent￿ s patriotism. It is the predicted score for the ￿rst prin-
cipal factor derived from a set of 10 patriotism questions.
See Table 2 for a description of the control variables.
20for individuals with an income above 60% and 70% respectively. Comparing columns (4),
(3) and (2) we ￿nd (some) evidence that the positive association between patriotism and
tax burden is stronger for the upper part of the income distribution.
Second, we employ a quantile regression approach to evaluate the e⁄ect of patriotism on
several parts of the tax burden (and thereby, though indirectly, income) distribution. While
standard OLS estimates conditional mean functions, quantile regression methods allow us to
estimate ￿models in which quantiles of the conditional distribution of the response variable
are expressed as functions of observed covariates￿(Koenker and Hallock 2001, 143; see also
Koenker 2005). By analyzing a full range of conditional quantile functions, this technique
provides a richer analysis of the stochastic relation among the variables.
Since there are not enough observations to perform the quantile regression on the ag-
gregate level, we restrict the analysis to our main sample of respondents earning more than
60% of the average worker￿ s income. While our baseline speci￿cation in the second column
of Table 2 provides just one estimate for the conditional mean, we now analyze the rela-
tionship between tax burden and the regressors for di⁄erent quantiles of the tax burden
distribution.
The results from estimating ￿ve distinct quantile regressions (based on equation (5)) for
the 0.50 to 0.90 quantiles of the tax burden distribution of the main sample are depicted
in Table 4. Table 4 illustrates that the patriotism-e⁄ect is strongest for the upper part of
the tax burden distribution. While in almost all cases the coe¢ cient estimate is found to
be positive (this holds also for lower quantiles; not reported), the coe¢ cient estimates only
become signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 when surpassing the 0.6 quantile. The e⁄ect slackens
o⁄ again toward the higher ends of the tax burden distribution. For the respondents with
the highest tax rates (in the sample), the patriotism variable is once again insigni￿cant.
This result may simply derive from a limited number of observations at this range (indeed,
the mass of the distribution of tax burdens is quite low at the upper tail). Taking the
result at face value, however, it appears to ￿t with a theoretical argument by Breyer and
Ursprung (1998) who explain that the very upper end of the income distribution may not
pay much taxes, because this upper end, instead of accepting high taxes, may bribe the
decision makers in a representative democracy.
21Table 4: Quantile Regression Results
Quantile
0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9
IncPos 0:09612￿￿￿ 0:09949￿￿￿ 0:09809￿￿￿ 0:12201￿￿￿ 0:12478￿￿￿
(0:00000) (0:00039) (0:00113) (0:00143) (0:00118)
GDP 9:67611￿￿￿ 10:20596￿￿￿ 2:55035￿￿￿ 0:85694￿￿￿ ￿0:26622￿
(0:00000) (0:04994) (0:15607) (0:17789) (0:16042)
Unem 1:08261￿￿￿ 1:16453￿￿￿ ￿0:25194￿￿￿ 0:10138￿￿￿ 0:21393￿￿￿
(0:00000) (0:00854) (0:02638) (0:03322) (0:03716)
IDEO 1:95204￿￿￿ 1:73278￿￿￿ 3:56494￿￿￿ 5:63174￿￿￿ 6:94562￿￿￿
(0:00000) (0:01118) (0:02777) (0:02959) (0:02605)
Decentr 0:04690￿￿￿ 0:03814￿￿￿ ￿0:09758￿￿￿ ￿0:01640￿￿￿ ￿0:05173￿￿￿
(0:00000) (0:00123) (0:00345) (0:00375) (0:00351)
Proud 0:00000 0:03809 0:17767￿￿￿ 0:24369￿￿￿ ￿0:00000
(0:00000) (0:02435) (0:06705) (0:08400) (0:07836)
_cons ￿94:89520￿￿￿ ￿99:51628￿￿￿ ￿6:17993￿￿￿ ￿2:10792 9:41614￿￿￿
(0:00000) (0:58560) (1:83211) (2:10156) (1:99268)
N 1777 1777 1777 1777 1777
Robust standard errors in parentheses
￿ p < 0:10,
￿￿ p < 0:05,
￿￿￿ p < 0:01
Results are from quantile regressions. The explained variable is the tax burden of indi-
vidual i in country j.
Proud is respondent￿ s patriotism. It is the predicted score for the ￿rst principal factor
derived from a set of 10 patriotism questions.
See Table 2 for a description of the control variables.
223.3 Robustness analysis
3.3.1 Reverse causality?
A high (income) tax burden may correspond to extensive (or high-quality) public goods pro-
vision, which might lead citizens to like their country better and, hence, be more patriotic.
While such a reverse-causality argument may hold regarding questions about proudness of
certain aspects of their country (such as the social security system or fair and equal treat-
ment of individuals), it is much harder to maintain for other proudness questions (such as a
country￿ s economic achievements or political in￿ uence in the world). Nonetheless, this sec-
tion takes this potential reverse causality argument seriously and employs an instrumental
variables (IV) approach to evaluate to what extent it might a⁄ect our results. Finding a
suitable instrument for patriotism is not straightforward. One could think of medals won
in Olympic Games or victories in wars, but while the former only caters to one very speci￿c
aspect of possible patriotic sentiment (and one that does not appear to matter very much
in our data, cf. Table 1), the latter is hard to operationalize (especially as most countries in
our sample have not experienced any major con￿ icts since WWII; and even in that global
con￿ ict winners and losers are sometimes hard to determine accurately).
We instrument our measure of patriotism with the country￿ s number of neighbors. This
builds on the idea that it can be argued that citizens of countries with less neighbors are
more susceptible to patriotic feelings (while there is, a priori, no reason to believe that the
number of neighbors is related to tax burdens).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 show the IV results. For ease of comparison the ￿rst
two columns replicate the baseline OLS regression results (taken from columns (2) and (5)
of Table 2). The table shows that, both when using the individual-level sample as when
relying on the more aggregated sample, the relation between patriotism and tax burdens
remains qualitatively similar.31 That is, the coe¢ cient estimate retains its positive sign and
statistical signi￿cance at conventional levels. While the estimated coe¢ cient of patriotism
becomes larger (suggesting there is some downward bias in the OLS estimations), the IV
estimations con￿rm the results presented in the baseline estimation.
31The coe¢ cient for the instrument in the ￿rst stage is precisely estimated (statistically di⁄erent from zero
at the 5 % level).
23Table 5: Instrumental Variable Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
IncPos 0:10195￿￿￿ 0:08619￿￿￿ 0:05755￿￿ 0:00730
(0:00381) (0:00884) (0:02814) (0:05175)
GDP 3:96927￿￿￿ 0:59531 ￿19:83290￿ ￿18:22327￿￿
(0:51366) (0:79669) (10:82730) (8:90185)
Unem 0:38383￿￿￿ 0:09516 1:19259￿￿ 1:51726￿
(0:08271) (0:13024) (0:56128) (0:83818)
IDEO 2:54898￿￿￿ 3:18169￿￿￿ 5:71525￿￿￿ 4:05669￿￿￿
(0:08774) (0:32262) (1:54001) (1:42531)
Decentr ￿0:05294￿￿￿ ￿0:05474￿￿ 0:03599 0:21634
(0:01048) (0:02323) (0:07697) (0:15875)
Proud 0:67330￿￿￿ 51:19768￿￿
(0:19506) (23:02788)
Aver. Proud 1:89189￿￿￿ 56:20055￿￿
(0:62989) (23:79564)
_cons ￿28:35142￿￿￿ 8:17895 189:39538￿ 170:84283￿￿
(5:97603) (8:77925) (99:81564) (81:15100)
N 1777 282 1777 282
Robust standard errors in parentheses
￿ p < 0:10,
￿￿ p < 0:05,
￿￿￿ p < 0:01
The explained variable for columns (1) and (3) is the tax burden of individual i
in country j. The explained variable for columns (2) and (4) is the average in-
come tax burden calculated (separately for each country) for all available income
classes.
Proud is respondent￿ s patriotism. It is the predicted score for the ￿rst principal
factor derived from a set of 10 patriotism questions. Aver. Proud is the average
patriotism calculated (separately for each country) for all available income classes.
See Table 2 for a description of the control variables.
Columns (1) and (2) present OLS regressions, while columns (3) and (4) show
the corresponding IV regression results.
243.3.2 Alternative patriotism measure
The 2003-wave of the ISSP survey contains a number of further questions probing people￿ s
attachment to their country. Speci￿cally, there are six such questions: ￿How close do you
feel to [country]?￿ , ￿I would rather be a citizen of [country] than of any other country in
the world￿ , ￿There are some things about [country] today that make me feel ashamed of
[country]￿, ￿The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like
[country nationality]￿, ￿Generally speaking, [country] is a better country than most other
countries￿and ￿People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong￿ .
These were not included in the analysis thus far for two reasons. First, they constitute a
more heterogeneous set of questions, and appear to generally invoke more interpretation on
the part of the respondent (while ￿being proud￿might be a sentiment that is more easily
evaluated). Moreover, reference to a sense of superiority in some of these questions might
better re￿ ect nationalism, rather than patriotism (see, for example, Huddy and Khatib,
2007, and references therein). Second, the potential reverse causality argument is likely to
be stronger for these questions. As they do not refer to evaluation of proudness of certain,
well-de￿ned achievements, the answer is likely to be of a more general nature and might be
￿contaminated￿by the country￿ s ￿scal policies.32
Nonetheless, as a check on the robustness of our ￿ndings to the speci￿c set of questions
selected in the main analysis, we re-estimate the model including these additional questions
in the factor analysis. The ￿rst two columns of Table 6 regress individuals￿tax burdens on
the alternative patriotism measure (Proud II), which is the score of the ￿rst principal factor
of the extended set of 16 questions. Columns (3) and (4) replicate the aggregate analysis
using the alternative patriotism index.
The regression results are virtually unchanged. Patriotism is once again signi￿cantly
positively related to the tax burden in all estimations, in line with theoretical predictions.
This, however, appears mainly due to the fact that the additional questions do not load
strongly on the ￿rst factor. Hence, the resulting score of the ￿rst factor closely resembles the
previous patriotism measure leading to similar regression results. Our ￿ndings support the
32As the responses to these questions are thus likely to be (at least as) endogenous as those to the questions
used in the main analysis, they could obviously not be used as instruments in the IV estimation.
25Table 6: Alternative patriotism measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
IncPos 0:12131￿￿￿ 0:10097￿￿￿ 0:08492￿￿￿ 0:08679￿￿￿









Proud II 2:31258￿￿￿ 0:57676￿￿￿
(0:23537) (0:20093)
Aver. Proud II 3:61881￿￿￿ 1:97953￿￿￿
(0:66948) (0:63726)
_cons 14:30152￿￿￿ ￿27:74955￿￿￿ 19:60420￿￿￿ 8:98435
(0:55031) (6:00383) (1:16556) (8:69718)
N 1884 1722 288 278
adj. R2 0:32834 0:53821 0:28137 0:53230
Robust standard errors in parentheses
￿ p < 0:10,
￿￿ p < 0:05,
￿￿￿ p < 0:01
Results are from OLS regressions. The explained variable for columns (1) and (2) is
the tax burden of individual i in country j. The explained variable for columns (3)
and (4) is the average income tax burden calculated (separately for each country)
for all available income classes.
Proud II is respondent￿ s patriotism. It is the predicted score for the ￿rst principal
factor derived from an extended set of 10 patriotism and six nationalism questions.
Aver. Proud II is the average patriotism calculated (separately for each country)
for all available income classes.
See Table 2 for a description of the control variables.
26view that the six additional questions indeed refer to nationalism rather than patriotism.
3.3.3 Additional control variables
The model could clearly be extended by regarding, for example, the e⁄ects of globalization,
trade openness, and so on. Since the coe¢ cients for these variables were unstable and
mostly insigni￿cant, we have dropped these from the model. We also considered various
measures of governance quality (see Kaufmann et al., 2006). Because the six indexes are
highly correlated with each other, columns (1)-(6) of Table 7 introduce them one by one into
the model. This a⁄ects mainly the coe¢ cient estimates of previously included country-level
controls (especially GDP and unemployment), which is due to the correlation between the
country variables like GDP and the governance quality measures. Except for column (3)
the point estimates for patriotism are smaller compared to our baseline regression. This
suggests a weak positive correlation between patriotism and the various governance quality
measures. However, patriotism has additional explanatory power in all six regressions.
3.3.4 Country-by-country elimination
Finally, we drop all countries one by one from the sample to assess whether our results are
driven by the inclusion of any of these. The results of these 21 additional regressions are
presented graphically in Figure 1. The value for the coe¢ cient estimates in each estimation
are given on the Y-axis, while the country excluded from a given run of the model is
presented on the X-axis. The squares in the ￿gure represent the point estimates for each
regression, whereas the lines indicate the 90% con￿dence interval around each estimate.
Note that in all cases we included the full set of control variables (though we do not report
these to preserve space). The results clearly indicate that in all subsamples (which have at
least 1,500 observations each) the e⁄ect of patriotism on the tax burden remains positive and
statistically signi￿cant at least at the 90% con￿dence level. The coe¢ cient estimates are,
moreover, very stable across these additional estimations (with the exception of excluding
Denmark, which causes the coe¢ cient estimate for patriotism to drop by about half). Hence,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There is by now an extensive literature on nationalist movements and national identities.
While, as argued above, nationalism and patriotism should be clearly distinguished, this
literature is interesting nonetheless as it has brought forward a wide range of arguments as
to why such identities develop (or are developed). These include cultivation of the identity
for itself (e.g., Anderson 1991) or to delineate the boundaries of the nation as autonomous
and distinguishable relative to others (e.g., Prizel 1998). Our analysis suggests one further
reason to develop such identities, or, at least, an important side-e⁄ect of developing such
identities: to provide a supportive base for the welfare state and intra-state redistribution.
Piecemeal evidence on a number of countries suggests that countries indeed actively use
their education system for teaching their young generations patriotism and for incubating
emotions and values such as ￿loving your own country￿ .33 Of course, such policies may be
33A comprehensive international study of this phenomenon is not known to us. Newspaper reports some
years back show that educational reforms have been discussed or implemented in Japan (The Economist
19/12/06, page 92) and Poland (Neue Z￿richer Zeitung, 11/6/2006), by which patriotism receives more
emphasis at school. Maosen (1990) reports that inculcating patriotism was and is an aim of the education
policy in China both in imperial and communist times up to today. In the former German Democratic
Republic, ￿loving the German Democratic Republic￿was the ￿rst law for their youth organizations. Even
democratic countries like the United States have a tradition of instilling patriotism at an early stage of
life. An example for this is the Boy Scouts Charter (chapter 3) which states ￿...to teach them patriotism,
courage, self-reliance and kindred virtues, using the methods which are now in common use by Boy Scouts￿
as one of their main educational objectives.
29pursued for many purposes. We have shown in this analysis that, once these preferences
exist, they can be, and seemingly are, instrumentalized for ￿scal policy. Given the negative
side-e⁄ects that patriotism may have, we would certainly not like to argue that this is a
desirable way to sustain the welfare state. However, it follows from our ￿ndings that it can
at least be seen as a positive side-e⁄ect of patriotic sentiments.
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365 Appendix
We prove Propositions 1 and 2 in this Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1. We turn to an analysis of subgame perfect equilibrium and
solve by backward induction. Consider Stage 2. At this stage (￿A;￿B) is given. For










To con￿rm this, ￿rst note that the individuals with low income constitute a majority and
have the same preferences regarding combinations of (tK;SL
K;SH
K).34 For any given tK,
individuals with low productivity prefer the smallest possible transfer to individuals with
high productivity. Hence, SH
k = 0 and SL
K = TK(tK) describes their most preferred transfers
for any given tax rate.35 Moreover, it can be con￿rmed that (A-1) is the unique maximum
of




)(wL + ￿KwH) + hK + ￿i (A-2)
and that t￿




K);0) constitutes the unique
equilibrium in stage 2 in each country.
Turning to Stage 1, we can now consider the migration choices. Individuals anticipate
the shares of highly productive individuals in the migration equilibrium and the tax rates
(A-1) that are induced by these shares. The payo⁄ of a highly productive individual that
chooses to reside in country K is
34Recall that we assume nA + nB < 1. If nA + nB > 1, self-sorting may occur in the equilibrium in the
simple framework chosen here. Similarly, if the low income individuals can also migrate, existence of
a pure strategy equilibrium may become an issue. However, our assumptions match well with a more
general, but more cumbersome, framework in which migration costs of individuals are drawn from a
random distribution. In such a setting, only a few high income earners will be fully mobile, while many
have intermediate, high or even prohibitive costs of migration. If so, the median voter in both countries
has low income, which is what is really needed for the qualitative results we ￿nd.
35We require uniform treatment of all individuals regarding the tax rate, and uniform redistribution among
groups that are homogeneous regarding their productivities or skills. As is known from Epple and Romano
(1996) and the work they inspired, assumptions about feasible redistribution are important for the types







wL+￿KwH)wH + hK + ￿i if i 2 IK
(1 ￿ ￿K
wH
wL+￿KwH)wH if i = 2 IK
. (A-3)
The payo⁄s in the two lines of (A-3) refer to whether i was born in K or not. An individual
i born in A will stay in A if (1 ￿ ￿A
wH
wL+￿AwH)wH + hA + ￿i > (1 ￿ ￿B
wH
wL+￿BwH)wH. This
condition can be solved for the critical ￿i that makes i indi⁄erent between staying and







)wH ￿ hA. (A-4)
Accordingly, assuming subgame perfect equilibrium play, the set of highly productive indi-
viduals who are born in A and migrate to B are







Recall that G(:) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the random component ￿
of patriotism. Similarly, the size of the set of high income earners from B who migrate to
A are
nBG((￿￿t)wH ￿ hB). (A-6)
Migration choices based on anticipated taxes hence determine the size of the sets of (post-
migration) high income earners in the two countries as
￿A = nA (1 ￿ G(￿twH ￿ hA)) + nBG((￿￿t)wH ￿ hB)
￿B = nAG(￿twH ￿ hA) + nB (1 ￿ G((￿￿t)wH ￿ hB)) :
(A-7)
Each individual need not consider the change of ￿A or ￿B from her own migration choice
here, because each individual has a measure of zero.
For existence of an equilibrium in Proposition 1 note that (A-1) establishes a one-to-one
relationship between tK and ￿K. Replacing ￿t with the equilibrium value (t￿
A(￿A)￿t￿
B(￿B))
in the subgame perfect equilibrium for given ￿A and ￿B turns (A-7) into a system of two
































The existence and uniqueness of a subgame perfect equilibrium is reduced to the question
of whether this system has a unique solution. To consider this, note that (A-8) describes a
self-mapping g : ￿ ! ￿ for
￿ ￿ f(x;y)jx 2 [0;nA + nB];y 2 [0;nA + nB];x + y = nA + nBg (A-9)
The pair (￿A;￿B) 2 ￿ by de￿nition. Moreover, (￿A(￿A;￿B);￿B(￿A;￿B)) 2 ￿, as ￿K(￿A;￿B) 2
[0;nA+nB] and ￿A(￿A;￿B)+￿B(￿A;￿B) = nA+nB by (A-8). The mapping g is continuous
(by using the continuity of G). Moreover, ￿ as de￿ned in (A-9) is a compact and convex
set. Hence, Brouwer￿ s ￿xed point theorem can be applied to con￿rm that this mapping has
a ￿xed point (￿￿
A;￿￿
B). This ￿xed point characterizes the post-migration shares of highly
productive individuals in the two countries in an equilibrium.
It remains to con￿rm that this solution is unique. Note that the functional relationship



































at ￿ = ￿B .
This slope is positive and smaller than 1. Similarly, the second equation reveals a slope
d￿B
d￿A that is positive throughout but smaller than 1. Accordingly, these two functions can
intersect only once. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (A-1) to replace ￿A and ￿B in (A-7) yields a system of
equations that determines the equilibrium tax rates as functions of nA;nB;wH;wL;hA;hB
A-3and G(￿):
tAwL
wH(1￿tA) = nA (1 ￿ G((tA ￿ tB)wH ￿ hA)) + nBG((tB ￿ tA)wH ￿ hB)
tBwL
wH(1￿tB) = nAG((tA ￿ tB)wH ￿ hA) + nB (1 ￿ G((tB ￿ tA)wH ￿ hB))
(A-11)
The system of equations (A-11) determines the equilibrium tax rates in the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium. Totally di⁄erentiating (A-11) with respect to tA, tB, hA and hB yields




￿X ￿ ￿A X






































































￿X ￿ ￿A X








A)(X + ￿B) ￿ nAG0
AX]




(X + ￿A)(X + ￿B) ￿ X2 > 0
The positive sign is obtained as follows. The denomiator is positive, as both X and ￿B are




















￿X ￿ ￿A X








A)(￿X ￿ ￿A) ￿ (￿nAG0
A)X]




(X + ￿A)(X + ￿B) ￿ X2 < 0:
Again, the denomiator is postitive. The numerator is negative, explaining the negative sign.




As tA = tB in the equilibrium for nA = nB, this completes the proof of Proposition 2. ￿
A-5